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Abstract—Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) play
an important role as tools for identifying potential network
threats. In the context of ever-increasing traffic volume on
computer networks, flow-based NIDS arise as good solutions for
real-time traffic classification. In recent years, different flow-
based classifiers have been proposed using machine learning
algorithms. Nevertheless, the classical machine learning algo-
rithms have some limitations. For instance, they require large
amounts of labeled data, which might be difficult to obtain.
Additionally, most machine learning algorithms are not capable
of domain adaptation, i.e., after being trained on a specific
dataset, they are not general enough to be applied to other
related data distributions. And, finally, many of the models
inferred by this algorithms are black boxes, hard to understand
in detail. To overcome these limitations, we propose a new flow-
based classifier, called Energy-based Flow Classifier (EFC). This
anomaly-based classifier uses inverse statistics to infer a statistical
model based on labeled benign examples. We show that EFC is
capable of accurately performing a one-class flow classification
and is more adaptable to new domains than classical machine
learning algorithms. Given the positive results obtained on three
different datasets (CIDDS-001, CICIDS17 and CICDDoS19), we
consider EFC to be a promising algorithm to perform robust
flow-based traffic classification.
Index Terms—Flow-based Network Intrusion Detection,
Anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection, Network Flow
Classification, Network Intrusion Detection Systems, Energy-
based Flow Classifier, Inverse Potts Model, Domain Adaptation.
I. INTRODUCTION
SYMANTEC’S Internet Security Threat Report [1] pointsout a 56% increase in the number of web attacks in 2019.
Network scans, denial of service, and brute force attacks are
among the most common threats. Such malicious activities
threaten not only individuals, but also some collective or-
ganizations such as public health, financial, and government
institutions. In this context, Network Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (NIDSs) play an important role as tools for identifying
potential threats [2].
There are two main approaches for NIDSs regarding the
kind of data analyzed: packet-based and flow-based. In the
former, deep packet inspection is performed taking into ac-
count individual packet payloads as well as header information
[3]. In the latter, flows, i.e., packet collections, are analyzed
regarding their properties, e.g., duration, number of packets,
number of bytes, and source/destination port [3]. In order to
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perform traffic classification in real time, a huge volume of
data must be analyzed, which makes deep packet inspection
too costly to be applied. Since flow-based approaches can
classify the whole traffic inspecting an equivalent to 0.1% of
the total volume, NIDSs based on flow analysis arise as good
solutions for real-time traffic classification [4].
In recent years, different flow-based classifiers have been
proposed based on both shallow and deep learning [5]. Ac-
cording to the report in [5], the best flow-based classifiers
achieve around 99% accuracy. Although quite accurate, clas-
sical Machine Learning (ML)-based classifiers require labeled
malicious traffic samples to perform training. However, real
traffic labelling might be difficult, specially in the case of
malicious traffic. In addition to that, ML-based classifiers,
after trained on a specific data distribution, usually do not
work when applied to other related distribution, i.e., they have
low capability of domain adaptation [6], [7]. Moreover, most
ML algorithms are well-known to be black box mechanisms,
difficult to be understood and readjusted in detail [8]. In this
regard, there is a clear need of a new flow-based classifier
for NIDSs, which generates an understandable model (white
box), is based solely on benign examples, and is adaptable to
different domains.
We propose a novel classifier called Energy-based Flow
Classifier (EFC), which is a network flow classifier based
on the inverse Potts model. EFC is a white box algorithm,
since the statistical model inferred by it can be analyzed in
detail regarding individual parameter values. Moreover, EFC
performs one-class classification, i.e., as long as normal traffic
can be characterized in flows, it will be able to detect the oppo-
site, malicious traffic. We compared the performance of EFC
against a variety of classifiers using three different datasets,
i.e., CIDDS-001 [9], CICIDS17 [10], and CICDDoS19 [11].
Our results show that classifiers based on classical ML are
more sensitive to small changes in data distribution than EFC.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• The proposal and implementation of a flow classifier for
NIDSs based on the inverse Potts model;
• A performance comparison of the proposed classifier with
classical ML classifiers using three different datasets;
• An analysis of how different classifiers perform when
trained within one domain and tested in another related
domain.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we briefly present the state-of-the-art in flow-based NIDSs. In
Section III, we describe the structure of a network flow and
present a preliminary analysis of the datasets considered here.
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2In Section IV, we introduce the statistical model proposed and
the classifier implementation. In Section V, we present results
obtained regarding the analysis of the statistical model and
the classification experiments performed. Finally, in Section
VI, we present our conclusions and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review the state-of-the-art in flow-
based network intrusion detection. We show some early work
in the field, as well as the recent advances. In the end, some
previous work on CIDDS-001, CICIDS17 and CICDDoS19
datasets are shown.
Several ML-based flow classifiers have been explored over
the last 15 years for network intrusion detection. There are
recent comprehensive surveys, in which ML-based classifiers
used in this context are reviewed [5], [12], [13], [14]. Within
the algorithms evaluated in these surveys, Random Forest (RF)
performs specially well, and has been applied in most of the
recently proposed NIDS [15], [16], [17]. In this work, we
deploy most of the ML-classifiers covered in recent surveys
to serve as baselines against which we compare our classifier.
Flow-based intrusion detection has also been explored in
modern contexts, i.e., Internet of Things (IoT) networks [18],
[19] and cloud environments [20], [21]. The proposed solu-
tions for intrusion detection in IoT and cloud environments
achieved satisfactory classification accuracy and feasible run-
ning times. However, their domain adaptation capability is
still a matter of investigation. In fact, most of the proposed
solutions from literature assume that there will be available
training sets to be used in all contexts, which is not necessarily
true. In this regard, we propose a flow-classifier solution that
is adapted to different domains without retraining.
In fact, domain adaptation is an important issue to con-
sider in intrusion detection, since malicious data is frequently
changing its characteristic when new attack types arise. Bartos
et al. [6] and Li et al. [7] proposed similar approaches to
cope with domain change by applying a data transformation
to reduce differences in data features across domains. Here,
we propose a classifier which is intrinsically adaptable to
different domains, since its leaning phase is based solely on
benign data. Hence, there is no need to transform data to
adapt data features, making our approach simpler and more
straightforward.
To assess EFC’s performance, one of the datasets we use
is CIDDS-001. This dataset was used by Verma and Ranga
(2018) [22] to assess the performance of K-Nearest Neighbors
(KNN) and k-means clustering algorithms when classifying
traffic. Both algorithms achieved over 99% accuracy. Also,
Ring et al. [23] explored slow port scans detection using
CIDDS-001. The approach proposed by them is capable of
accurately recognizing the attacks with low false alarm rate.
Finally, Abdulhammed et al. [24] also performed flow-based
classification on CIDDS-001, and proposed an approach that
is robust considering imbalanced network traffic. In summary,
CIDDS-001 is an up-to-date and relevant dataset to be used for
network flow-classification solutions, being one of our dataset
choices for assessing the performance of EFC.
Another two datasets we use in this work are CICIDS17
and CICDDoS19, from the Canadian Institute for Cyber
Security. CICIDS17 was recently used by Yulianto, Sukarno
and Suwastika to assess the performance of an adaboost-based
classifier [25]. Aksu and coworkers did the same in 2018 with
different ML classifiers [26]. CICIDS17 contains benign as
well as the most up-to-date common attacks, resembling true
real-world data, being a relevant dataset to consider for flow-
based traffic classification.
CICDDoS19, in turn, is a very recent dataset with focus
on DDoS attacks. A very recent work [27] proposes a real-
time entropy-based NIDS for detection of volumetric DDoS
in IoT and performs tests over CICDDoS19 dataset, among
other datasets. Another recent work [28] obtained over 99%
accuracy over CICDDoS19 dataset using a Convolutional Neu-
ral Network (CNN). And, finally, Novaes et al. [29] proposed
a system for intrusion detection based on fuzzy logic, which
was also tested on CICDDoS19. This shows that this dataset
is relevant and has been used to test different NIDS. Here, we
utilize CICDDoS19 and other two up-to-date datasets to test
our classifier and compare it to the performance of classical
ML classifiers.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A network flow is a set of packets that traverses in-
termediary nodes between end points within a given time
interval. Under the perspective of an intermediary node, i.e.,
an observation point, all packets belonging to a given flow
have a set of common features called flow keys. It means that
flow keys do not change for packets belonging to the same
flow, while the remaining features might vary. FlowScan [30]
is an example of tool capable of collecting data from a set
of packets and extracting flow features to be later exported in
different formats, such as NetFlow and IPFIX. Since NetFlow
is the most commonly used format, its main features are listed
bellow:
• Source/Destination IP (flow keys) - determine the origin
and destination of a given flow in the network;
• Source/Destination port (flow keys) - characterize differ-
ent kinds of network services e.g., port 22 is used to
access an ssh service;
• Protocol (flow key) - characterizes flows regarding the
transport protocol used e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP.
• Number of packets (feature) - total number of packets
captured in a flow;
• Number of bytes (feature) - total number of bytes in a
flow;
• Duration (feature) - total duration of a flow in seconds;
• Initial timestamp (feature) - system time when a flow
started to be captured.
Other features such as TCP Flags and Type of Service might
also be exported in some cases. The combination of different
flow keys and features characterize a flow and determine its
particular behavior.
Flow-based approaches are seen as good alternatives to
precede packet inspection in real-time NIDSs. The idea is to
deeply inspect only the packets belonging to flows considered
3to be suspicious by the flow-based classifier. A two-step
approach would notably reduce the amount of data analyzed,
while maintaining a high classification accuracy [4]. In this
work, we are only concerned with the first step, which is
the flow classification. We evaluate the performance of our
algorithm, the EFC, compared to other ML algorithms using
three different datasets. Different from what is usually done,
we also evaluate the performance of the algorithms in cases
in which the training is done on one data distribution and the
testing on another one (within the same dataset), characterizing
domain adaptation. In the following, we briefly describe the
datasets used for testing and characterize what constitutes a
domain adaptation in each of them.
A. CIDDS-001
CIDDS-001 [9] is a relatively recent dataset composed of
a set of flow samples captured within a simulated OpenStack
environment and another set of flow samples captured in a
real server. The former contains only simulated traffic, while
the latter contains both real and simulated traffic. Each sample
collected within these two environments has one of the labels
described in Table I.
Table I
LABELS WITHIN CIDDS-001 DATASET
Environment Labels
OpenStack normal, DoS, portScan, pingScan, bruteForce
External server normal, DoS, bruteForce, unknown, suspicious
Simulated benign flows are labeled as normal, while simu-
lated malicious flows are labeled as dos, portScan, pingScan
or bruteForce, depending on the type of attack simulated. The
labels suspicious and unknown, in turn, are used for real traffic.
The external server is open to user access through the ports
80 and 443. Hence, flows directed at these ports were labeled
as unknown, since they could be either benign or malicious.
All flows directed at other ports were labeled as suspicious.
Traffic was sampled in both the simulated and the external
environment during a four week period. For the simulated
environment, we consider only traffic captured in the second
week to reduce the amount of data to be analyzed. Similarly,
only external traffic captured within the third week was
assessed. These weeks were selected because they have the
fairest proportion between the different types of malicious
flows. Within this dataset, a change from the simulated data
distribution to the external server data distribution is a domain
change, requiring the classifiers to adapt.
CIDDS-001 dataset flow features are shown in Table II.
All features were taken into account for characterization and
classification except for Src IP, Dest IP and Date first seen.
This exceptions are because the latter one is intrinsically not
informative to differentiate flows and the former two are made
up in the context of the simulated network, and might be
confounding.
B. CICIDS17
CICIDS17 [10] dataset contains benign traffic and the most
up-to-date common attacks, resembling real-world data. This
Table II
FEATURES WITHIN CIDDS-001 DATASET
# Name Description
1 Src IP Source IP Address
2 Src Port Source Port
3 Dest IP Destination IP Address
4 Dest Port Destination Port
5 Proto Transport Protocol (e.g., ICMP, TCP, or UDP)
6 Date first seen Start time flow first seen
7 Duration Duration of the flow
8 Bytes Number of transmitted bytes
9 Packets Number of transmitted packets
10 Flags OR concatenation of all TCP Flags
dataset was built using the abstract behaviour of 25 users
based on the HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols.
The data was captured during one week, in July, 2017. The
attacks implemented include Brute Force FTP, Brute Force
SSH, DoS, Heartbleed, Web Attack, Infiltration, Botnet and
DDoS. They were executed both morning and afternoon on
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday (see Table III).
Within this dataset, a change from one day’s data distribution
to that of another day is a domain change, requiring the
classifiers to adapt.
Table III
ATTACKS WITHIN CICIDS17 DATASET
Week day Attacks
Monday
Tuesday FTP-Patator, SSH-Patator
Wednesday
DoS slowloris, DoS Slowhttptes, DoS Hulk, DoS
GoldenEye, Heartbleed Port 444
Thursday
Brute Force, XSS, Sql Injection, Dropbox download,
Cool disk
Friday Botnet ARES, Port Scan, DDoS LOIT
Flow features on this dataset were extracted using CI-
CFlowMeter [31]. There are in total 88 features, which are
not going to be cited here because of the limited space. All
features were considered here, except for Flow ID, Source IP,
Destination IP and Timestamp. This exceptions were made
because the features were either intrinsically not informative
or made up within a simulated environment.
C. CICDDoS19
CICDDoS19 [11] contains benign traffic and the most up-to-
date common DDoS attacks (volumetric and application: low
volume, slow rate), resembling real-world data. This dataset
contains different modern reflective DDoS attacks such as
PortMap, NetBIOS, LDAP, MSSQL, UDP, UDP-Lag, SYN,
NTP, DNS, and SNMP. The traffic was captured in January
(first day) and March (second day), 2019. Attacks were
executed during this period (see Table IV). Within this dataset,
a change from one day’s data distribution to that of another
day is a domain change, requiring the classifiers to adapt.
Flow features on this dataset were extracted using CI-
CFlowMeter [31]. All features were considered here, except
4Table IV
ATTACKS WITHIN CICDDOS19 DATASET
Day Attacks
First PortMap, NetBIOS, LDAP, MSSQL, UDP, UDP-Lag, SYN
Second
NTP, DNS, LDAP, MSSQL, NetBIOS, SNMP, SSDP, UDP,
UDP-Lag, WebDDos, SYN, TFTP
for Flow Id, Source IP, Destination IP and Timestamp. This
exceptions were made because the features were either in-
trinsically not informative or made up within a simulated
environment.
IV. STATISTICAL MODEL
The main task of inverse statistics is to infer a statistical
distribution based on a sample of it [32]. Methods using
inverse statistics have been successfully applied to problems
in other disciplines, e.g., the problem of predicting protein
contacts in Biophysics [32], [33]. Here, the statistical inference
is based on the Potts model [34]. This model provides a
mathematical description of interacting spins on a crystalline
lattice. Within the model framework, interacting spins are
mapped into a graph G(η ,ε) (see Figure 1 A)), where each
node i ∈ η = {1, ...,N} has an associated spin ai, which can
assume one value from a set Ω that contains all possible
individual quantum states. Each node i has also an associated
local field hi(ai) that is a function of ai’s state. Meanwhile,
each edge (i, j) ∈ ε , i, j ∈ η , has an associated coupling value
ei j(ai,a j) that is a function of the states of spins ai and a j
associated to nodes i and j. A specific system configuration
has an associated total energy, determined by the Hamiltonian
function H (a1...aN), which depends on all spin states.
Protocol
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Figure 1. A) Interacting spins on a crystalline lattice. B) Network flow
mapped into a graph structure.
In this work, we adapt the Potts model to characterize
network flows (see Figure 1 B)). An individual flow k is
represented by a specific graph configuration Gk(η ,ε). Instead
of spins, each node represents a selected feature i ∈ η =
{SrcPort, ...,Flags}. Within a given flow k, each feature i
assumes one value aki from the set Ωi that contains all
possible values for this feature. As in the Potts Model, each
feature i has an associated local field hi(aki). Meanwhile,
ε = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ η ; i 6= j} is the set of edges determined by
all possible pairs of features. Each edge has an associated
coupling value determined by the function ei j(aki,ak j).
Since the values of local fields and couplings depend on the
values assumed by features within a given flow, each distinct
flow will have a different combination of these quantities. As
in the Potts Model, local fields and couplings determine the
total "energy" H (ak1...akN) of each flow. For instance, in
Figure 1 B), the total "energy" of the flow is obtained by
summing up all values associated to the edges and to the
nodes, resulting in a total of -3. Note that what we call energy
is analogous to the notion of Hamiltonian in Quantum Me-
chanics. It is important to note that the model described here
is discrete, therefore continuous features must be discretized.
The classes for continuous features discretization are shown on
Supplementary Information. In the following, we present the
framework applied to perform the statistical model inference
and subsequent energy-based flow classification.
A. Model inference
In this section, a statistical model is going to be inferred in
terms of couplings and local field values to perform energy-
based flow classification. The main idea consists in extracting
a statistical model from benign flow samples to infer coupling
and local field values that characterize this type of traffic.
When calculating the energies of unlabeled flows using the
inferred values, it is expected that benign flows will have lower
energies than malicious flows.
Let (A1...AN) be an N-tuple of features, which can be in-
stantiated for flow k as (ak1...akN), with ak1 ∈Ω1, ...,akN ∈ΩN.
Each feature value aki is encoded by an integer from the set
Ω= {1,2, ...,Q}, i.e., all feature alphabets are the same Ωi =Ω
of size Q. If a given feature can only assume M values and
M < Q, it is considered that values M+1, ...,Q are possible,
but will never be observed empirically. For instance, if the
only possible values for feature protocol are {’TCP’, ’UDP’},
and given Q = 4. In this case, we would have the mapping
{’TCP’:1, ’UDP’:2, ’ ’:3, ’ ’:4 } and feature values 3 and 4
would never occur.
Now, let K be the set of all possible flows, i.e., all
possible combinations of feature values (K = ΩN), and let
S ⊂K be a sample of flows. We can use inverse statistical
physics to infer a statistical model associating a probability
P(ak1...akN) to each flow k ∈ K based on sample S . The
global statistical model P is inferred following the Entropy
Maximization Principle [35]:
max
P
− ∑
k∈K
P(ak1...akN)log(P(ak1...akN)) (1)
s.t.
∑
k∈K |aki=ai
P(ak1...akN) = fi(ai) (2)
∀i ∈ η ; ∀ai ∈Ω;
∑
k∈K |aki=ai,ak j=a j
P(ak1...akN) = fi j(ai,a j) (3)
∀(i, j) ∈ η2 | i 6= j; ∀(ai,a j) ∈Ω2;
where fi(ai) is the empirical frequency of value ai on feature
i and fi j(ai,a j) is the empirical joint frequency of the pair of
5values (ai,a j) of features i and j. Note that constraints 2 and
3 force model P to generate single as well as joint empirical
frequency counts as marginals. This way, the model is sure to
be coherent with empirical data.
Single and joint empirical frequencies fi(ai) and fi j(ai,a j)
are obtained from set S by counting occurrences of a given
feature value ai or feature value pair (ai,a j), respectively, and
dividing by the total number of flows in S . Since the set S
is finite and much smaller thanK , inferences based on S are
subjected to undersampling effects. Following the theoretical
framework proposed in [33], we add pseudocounts to empirical
frequencies to limit undersampling effects by performing the
following operations:
fi(ai)← (1−α) fi(ai)+ αQ (4)
fi j(ai,a j)← (1−α) fi j(ai,a j)+ αQ2 (5)
where (ai,a j) ∈Ω2 and 0≤ α ≤ 1 is a parameter defining the
weight of the pseudocounts. The introduction of pseudocounts
is equivalent to assuming that S is extended with a fraction
of flows with uniformly sampled features.
The proposed maximization can be solved using a La-
grangian function such as presented in [35], yielding the
following Boltzmann-like distribution:
P∗(ak1...akN) =
e−H (ak1...akN)
Z
(6)
where
H (ak1...akN) =− ∑
i, j|i< j
ei j(aki,ak j)−∑
i
hi(aki) (7)
is the Hamiltonian of flow k and Z (eq. (6)) is the partition
function that normalizes the distribution. Since in this work we
are not interested in obtaining individual flow probabilities,
Z is not required and, as a consequence, its calculation is
omitted. Our objective is to calculate individual flows energies,
i.e., individual Hamiltonians as determined in eq. (7).
Note that the Hamiltonian, as presented above, is fully
determined regarding the Lagrange multipliers ei j(·) and hi(·)
associated to constraints (2) and (3), respectively. Within
the Potts Model framework, the Lagrange multipliers have a
special meaning, with the set {ei j(ai,a j)|(ai,a j) ∈Ω2} being
the set of all possible coupling values between features i and
j and {hi(ai)|ai ∈Ω} the set of possible local fields associated
to feature i.
Inferring the local fields and pairwise couplings is dif-
ficult since the number of parameters exceeds the number
of independent constraints. Due to the physical properties
of interacting spins, it is possible to infer pairwise coupling
values ei j(ai,a j) using a Gaussian approximation. Assuming
that the same properties apply for flow features, we infer
coupling values as follows:
ei j(ai,a j) =−(C−1)i j(ai,a j), (8)
∀(i, j) ∈ η2,∀(ai,a j) ∈Ω2,ai,a j 6= Q
where
Ci j(ai,a j) = fi j(ai,a j)− fi(ai) f j(a j) (9)
is the covariance matrix obtained from single and joint empir-
ical frequencies. Taking the inverse of the covariance matrix
is a well known procedure in statistics to remove the effect of
indirect correlation in data [36]. Now, it is important to clarify
that the number of independent constraints in eq. (2) and eq.
(3) is actually N(N−1)2 (Q− 1)2 +N(Q− 1), even though the
model in eq. (6) has N(N−1)2 Q
2+NQ parameters. So, without
loss of generality, we set:
ei, j(ai,Q) = ei, j(Q,a j) = hi(Q) = 0 (10)
Thus, in eq. (8) there is no need to calculate ei, j(ai,a j)in case
ai or a j is equal to Q [33]. Afterwards, local fields hi(ai) can
be inferred using a mean-field approximation [37]:
fi(ai)
fi(Q)
= exp
(
hi(ai)+∑
j,a j
ei j(ai,a j) f j(a j)
)
, (11)
∀i ∈ η ,ai ∈Ω,ai 6= Q
where fi(Q) is the frequency of the last element ai = Q
for any feature i used for normalization. It is also worth
mentioning that the element Q is arbitrarily selected and could
be replaced by any other value in {1. . .Q} as long as the
selected element is kept the same for calculations of the local
fields of every feature i∈ η . Note that in eq. (11) the empirical
single frequencies fi(ai) and the coupling values ei j(ai,a j) are
known, yielding:
hi(ai) = ln
(
fi(ai)
fi(Q)
)
−∑
j,a j
ei j(ai,a j) f j(a j) (12)
In the mean-field approximation presented above, the inter-
action of a feature with its neighbors is replaced by an
approximate interaction with an averaged feature, yielding an
approximated value for the local field associated to it.
For further details about this calculations please refer to
[32]. Now that all model parameters are known, it is possible
to calculate a given flow energy according to eq. (7). In the
following, we are going to present the theoretical framework
implementation to perform a two-class, i.e., normal and mali-
cious, flow classification.
B. Energy-based flow classification
The energy of a given flow can be calculated according to
eq. (7) based on the values of its features and the parameters
from the statistical model inferred in the last section. In simple
terms, a given flow energy is the negative sum of couplings
and local fields associated to its features, according to a given
statistical model. It means that, if a flow resembles the ones
used to infer the model, it is likely to be low in energy. This
happens because features that were strongly coupled in sample
S that generated the model, are going to be present in that
flow.
Since EFC is an anomaly-based classifier, the statistical
model used for classification is inferred based only on normal
flow samples. We would then expect energies of normal
samples to be lower than energies of malicious samples. In this
sense, it is possible to classify flow samples as normal or ma-
licious based on a chosen energy threshold. The classification
6is performed by stating that samples with energy smaller than
the threshold are normal and samples with energy greater than
or equal to the threshold are malicious. Note that the threshold
for classification can be chosen in different ways and it can
be static or dynamic. In this work we will consider a static
threshold.
Algorithm 1 Energy-based Flow Classifier
Input: normal_ f lows(K×N), Q, α , cuto f f
1: import all model inference functions
2: f _i← SiteFreq(normal_ f lows,Q,α)
3: f _i j← PairFreq(normal_ f lows, f _i,Q,α)
4: e_i j←Couplings( f _i, f _i j,Q)
5: h_i← LocalFields(e_i j, f _i,Q)
6: while Scanning the Network do
7: f low← wait_for_incoming_flow()
8: e ← 0
9: for i ← 1 to N−1 do
10: a_i← f low[i]
11: for j ← i+1 to N do
12: a_ j← f low[ j]
13: if a_i 6= Q and a_ j 6= Q then
14: e← e− e_i j[i,a_i, j,a_ j]
15: end if
16: end for
17: if a_i 6= Q then
18: e← e−h_i[i,a_i]
19: end if
20: end for
21: if e≥ cuto f f then
22: stop_flow()
23: forward_to_DPI()
24: else
25: release_flow()
26: end if
27: end while
Algorithm 1 shows the implementation of EFC. On lines
2-5, the statistical model for the sampled flows is inferred,
as described by eqs. 4, 5, 8 and 12. Afterwards, on lines 6-
27, the classifier monitors the network waiting for a captured
flow. When a flow is captured, its energy is calculated on
lines 9-20, according to the Hamiltonian involving the received
flow features in equation (7). The computed flow energy is
compared to a known threshold (cutoff ) value on line 21.
In case the energy falls above the threshold, the flow is
classified as malicious and should be forwarded to deep packet
inspection (line 23) for assessment. Otherwise, the flow is
released and the classifier waits for another flow.
It is important to highlight that the temporal complexity of
the training step of EFC is O((M×Q)3+N×M2×Q2), where
N in the number of samples, M is the number of features, and
Q is the size of the alphabet. Meanwhile, the complexity of
the classification step for each sample is O(M). This means
that, in both steps, the complexity is more dependant on
the number of features chosen, which can be kept small by
using a feature selection mechanism, e.g., PCA. Therefore,
it is possible to see that EFC has a low computational cost
when compared to ML-based classifiers, such as artificial
neural networks, support vector machine and random forest.
Considering the implementation shown in this section, next,
we present the results obtained when EFC is used to perform
flow classification.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results obtained for EFC and
classical ML-based classifiers in different binary classification
experiments considering three different datasets, i.e., CIDDS-
001, CICIDS17 and CICDDoS19. First, we show that EFC
is able to separate normal from malicious flows based on
their energies, a result that is consistent for all the considered
datasets. Then, we present EFC’s classification performance
and compare it to the classification performance of classical
ML-based classifiers in different test scenarios within each
dataset.
It is important to highlight that the classification experi-
ments we perform in this work were designed not only to
assess the performance of different classifiers, but also to
investigate their capability of adaptation to different domains,
i.e., data distributions. Hence, we considered each day/context
within a given dataset to be a different domain and performed
two kinds of experiments: training/testing in the same domain,
and training/testing in different domains. In the case of train-
ing/testing in the same domain, 10-fold cross validation (CV)
was performed. Afterwards, the models inferred in each of the
10 steps of the CV were used to classify samples coming from
another domain. This was done to investigate each classifier’s
capability for domain adaptation. EFC’s cutoff was defined to
be at the 95th percentile of the energy distribution obtained in
the training phase.
A. EFC characterization
To investigate if EFC was able to correctly classify normal
and malicious traffic flow samples, we inferred a model based
on normal samples from simulated traffic within CIDDS-001
dataset. This model was then used to calculate the energy of
normal and malicious flow samples coming from simulated
traffic, and also from the external server traffic. Figure 2 first
plot shows energy values of 5,000 randomly sampled flows
labeled as normal and 5,000 randomly sampled flows labeled
as malicious from the simulated traffic contained in CIDDS-
001 dataset. The statistical model used to calculate the energies
was inferred based on 4,500 flows randomly sampled from the
simulated traffic. The separation between the two flow classes
is clear, i.e., normal flows energy distribution is clearly shifted
to the left in relation to malicious flows energy distribution.
Energy values of 5,000 randomly sampled flows labeled
as unknown and 5,000 randomly sampled flows labeled as
suspicious from the external sever traffic in CIDDS-001 are
shown in Figure 2 second plot. Traffic labeled as unknown
is traffic coming from external users with destination port 80
or 443, i.e., expected traffic. In this sense, here we consider
this traffic to be analogous to normal traffic. Traffic labeled as
suspicious, on the other hand, is traffic coming from external
users aimed at ports other than 80 and 443, i.e., unexpected
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Figure 2. Energy histogram of flow samples from simulated traffic (above)
and from the external server traffic (below) within CIDDS-001 dataset. The
energy classification threshold, defined as the 95th percentile of the training
distribution, is shown in red.
traffic. Hence, this traffic is considered here analogous to
malicious traffic. Note that the separation between these two
classes, i.e., unknown and suspicious, is also clear. In Figure 2
we can see that a portion of unknown traffic is mixed up
with suspicious traffic, which might be an indication that
this traffic, even with expected destination ports, is actually
malicious. It is important to note that it is possible to apply
the same energy threshold (around 140, i.e., 95th percentile
of the training distribution) to separate the two classes in
both the simulated and the external traffic scenarios. Because
the threshold learned in the simulated traffic scenario can be
applied to separate the traffic in the external server scenario,
we understand that the statistical model learned is adaptable
to different domains.
Figure 3 shows an analysis similar to the one described
above, but applied to CICIDS17 and CICDDoS datasets. The
two plots in the first row are the energies of flow samples
coming from the same day used to infer the statistical model,
while the two plots in the second row are the energies of flow
samples coming from a different day. Again, it becomes clear
that EFC is able to correctly discriminate between normal and
malicious flows. Moreover, we can see that it is possible to
apply the same cutoff for both situations, which reinforces the
claim that EFC is adaptable to different domains.
In summary, the results presented in this subsection show
that EFC can correctly discriminate between the two flow
classes considered, i.e., normal and malicious, and the results
CICIDS17 Friday working hours CICDDoS19 DrDoS NTP
Train/Test same day Train/Test same day
Train/Test different days Train/Test different days
Figure 3. Energy histograms for classification tests performed on samples
coming from the same day as training (first row) and samples coming from a
different day (second row) for both CICIDS17 (first column) and CICDDoS19
(second column) datasets. The energy classification threshold, defined as the
95th percentile of the training distribution, is shown in red.
are consistent for all datasets considered. In addition to that,
we observe that the classification threshold was defined based
on a specific training distribution and can be applied to a
different data distribution or domain. This is evidence that EFC
might be easily adaptable to different domains and does not
overfit data. In the following subsection, classification results
are shown for different classifiers and compared with the
results obtained for EFC. In the next subsection, comparative
results are shown.
B. Comparative analysis of EFC’s performance
We compared EFC to seven different ML classifiers found
in [12] that are available online at GitHub1. The classifiers
considered here are: K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [38], De-
cision Tree (DT) [39], [40], Adaboost [41], Random Forest
(RF) [42], Artificial Neural Network (ANN) [43], Naive Bayes
(NB) [44], and Support Vector Machine (SVM) [45], all
deployed with their default scikit-learn configurations. Flow
features were only discretized for EFC (see Supplementary
Information: Table XI), since discretization would probably
impair the performance of most ML algorithms. The metrics
used to compare the results were the F1 score and the area
under the ROC curve (AUC). The first metric, F1 score, is the
harmonic mean of the Precision and the Recall, i.e.,
F1 =
2
Precision−1+Recall−1
=
2 ·Precision ·Recall
Precision+Recall
(13)
where Precision = T P/(T P+FP), Recall = T P/(T P+FN),
TP are the true positives, i.e., normal traffic classified as nor-
mal, FP are the false positives, i.e., malicious traffic classified
as normal, and FN are the false negatives, i.e., malicious
traffic classified as normal. The second metric, area under the
ROC curve (AUC), is one of the most widespread evaluation
1https://github.com/vinayakumarr/Network-Intrusion-Detection
8metrics for binary classifiers [46], [47]. The ROC curve is
constructed by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the
false positive rate (FPR) at different classification thresholds.
This means that the AUC is the probability that a randomly
chosen positive example will receive a higher score than a
randomly chosen negative one. One of the main advantages of
the AUC is that it is invariant to changes in class distribution,
i.e., the ROC curve will not change if the distribution changes
in a test set, but the underlying conditional distributions from
which the data are drawn stay the same [48], [47]. Since we
are interested in evaluating domain adaptation, this metric is
specially interesting to be adopted in this work.
1) CIDDS-001: To evaluate the performance of EFC com-
pared to different ML algorithms we constructed two test sets
using a subset of CIDDS-001 dataset. Test set I is composed
solely by simulated traffic flow samples (with no common
samples between them), while test set II is composed by exter-
nal traffic flow samples. Dataset undersampling was performed
in order to obtain a more homogeneous distribution of the
different malicious traffic subclasses. Details about how this
undersampling was performed are described in Supplementary
Information: Appendix A.
Table V
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS TRAINED WITH
CIDDS-001 - SIMULATED TRAFFIC
Train/Test simulated Train simulated, test external
Classifier F1 score AUC F1 score AUC
NB 0.799 ± 0.010 0.812 ± 0.023 0.369 ± 0.015 0.869 ± 0.002
KNN 0.930 ± 0.015 0.976 ± 0.006 0.189 ± 0.050 0.638 ± 0.006
DT 0.992 ± 0.004 0.992 ± 0.004 0.636 ± 0.072 0.720 ± 0.033
Adaboost 0.991 ± 0.006 0.999 ± 0.001 0.523 ± 0.038 0.711 ± 0.063
RF 0.993 ± 0.005 0.999 ± 0.002 0.613 ± 0.009 0.729 ± 0.061
SVM 0.803 ± 0.009 0.783 ± 0.039 0.443 ± 0.005 0.435 ± 0.026
ANN 0.812 ± 0.009 0.808 ± 0.045 0.443 ± 0.005 0.435 ± 0.026
EFC 0.957 ± 0.015 0.987 ± 0.009 0.839 ± 0.033 0.926 ± 0.000
It is clear from Table V that most classifiers achieve high
values of both F1 score and AUC over the test set containing
simulated traffic. For instance, DT, Adaboost and RF achieved
F1 score and AUC above 99%. EFC also achieved good
results, with an F1 score of 0.957 ± 0.015 F1 and AUC 0.987
± 0.009. Here, it is worth pointing out that EFC uses only
half of the samples (only the normal ones) in the training
phase, which means it receives much less information than the
other algorithms, and even so achieves similar performance.
On the test set containing external traffic, only EFC achieves
F1 score over 80% and AUC above 90%, showing that EFC
is adaptable to different domains regarding both the simulated
and external environments from dataset CIDDS-001. Such
context resilience is a highly desirable trait in a flow-based
classifier, since NIDSs classifiers are trained usually in a
synthetic environment to be later applied in real context.
2) CICIDS17: To evaluate the performance of different
classifiers over this dataset, two different experiments were
performed. In each experiment, two test sets were constructed:
one comprising traffic of one specific day, and the other
comprising traffic of all other days, except the chosen one
(see Supplementary Information: Appendix B). Days in which
there was not enough samples to compose a test set were left
out.
Table VI
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS TRAINED WITH
CICIDS17 - FRIDAY WORKING HOURS
Train/Test same day Train/Test different days
Classifier F1 score AUC F1 score AUC
NB 0.773 ± 0.009 0.791 ± 0.018 0.642 ± 0.026 0.660 ± 0.032
KNN 0.983 ± 0.005 0.994 ± 0.003 0.769 ± 0.007 0.829 ± 0.009
DT 0.998 ± 0.002 0.998 ± 0.002 0.812 ± 0.099 0.846 ± 0.068
Adaboost 0.999 ± 0.001 1.000 ± 0.000 0.679 ± 0.017 0.898 ± 0.070
RF 0.999 ± 0.001 1.000 ± 0.000 0.715 ± 0.056 0.973 ± 0.004
SVM 0.963 ± 0.005 0.992 ± 0.002 0.761 ± 0.004 0.821 ± 0.015
ANN 0.988 ± 0.003 0.999 ± 0.000 0.761 ± 0.004 0.821 ± 0.015
EFC 0.952 ± 0.007 0.993 ± 0.002 0.913 ± 0.005 0.984 ± 0.002
Table VI shows the results obtained when the training was
performed on Friday. When tested on data from the same day,
DT, Adaboost and RF had the results with both F1 score
and AUC above 99%. EFC also performed well, achieving
a F1 score of 0.952 ± 0.007 and an AUC of 0.993 ± 0.002.
Similarly to what was observed in CIDDS-001 dataset, EFC
is again the best classifier when tested on a different day. In
this case, EFC achieved a F1 score of 0.913 ± 0.005 and an
AUC of 0.9884 ± 0.002. In this case, RF also performed well,
achieving above 97% AUC.
Table VII
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS TRAINED WITH
CICIDS17 - WEDNESDAY WORKING HOURS
Train/Test same day Train/Test different days
Classifier F1 score AUC F1 score AUC
NB 0.930 ± 0.007 0.954 ± 0.005 0.826 ± 0.004 0.874 ± 0.005
KNN 0.980 ± 0.005 0.992 ± 0.003 0.856 ± 0.003 0.904 ± 0.002
DT 0.996 ± 0.002 0.996 ± 0.002 0.957 ± 0.010 0.959 ± 0.009
Adaboost 0.999 ± 0.001 1.000 ± 0.000 0.970 ± 0.003 1.000 ± 0.000
RF 0.998 ± 0.001 1.000 ± 0.000 0.951 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.000
SVM 0.953 ± 0.004 0.982 ± 0.006 0.853 ± 0.000 0.918 ± 0.003
ANN 0.984 ± 0.004 0.997 ± 0.001 0.853 ± 0.000 0.918 ± 0.003
EFC 0.956 ± 0.005 0.993 ± 0.002 0.895 ± 0.001 0.953 ± 0.001
Despite the favourable results obtained in the first exper-
iment, it is possible to see in Table VII that Adaboost and
RF outperformed EFC when trained on Wednesday. Adaboost
and RF achieved better results both when training and testing
in the same day, and when training and testing on different
days. This might be due to the greater diversity of attack
types present on Wednesday compared to Friday, thus giving
more information for the ML algorithms. However, even if it
was not the best, EFC had a good performance in both tests,
achieving over 99% AUC in the first test and over 95% AUC
in the second. Therefore, this results are aligned to the other
results presented to this point, pointing out that EFC is easily
adaptable to different domains.
3) CICDDoS19: To evaluate the performance of different
classifiers over CICDDoS19 dataset, three different experi-
ments were performed. In each experiment, two test sets were
constructed: one comprising traffic of one specific day, and the
other comprising traffic of all other days, except the chosen
9one (see Supplementary Information: Appendix C). Days in
which there was not enough samples to compose a test set
were left out.
Table VIII
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS TRAINED WITH
CICDDOS19 - DDOS NTP
Train/Test same day Train/Test different days
Classifier F1 score AUC F1 score AUC
NB 0.735 ± 0.009 0.647 ± 0.015 0.579 ± 0.087 0.500 ± 0.028
KNN 0.975 ± 0.007 0.989 ± 0.005 0.523 ± 0.031 0.663 ± 0.046
DT 0.999 ± 0.001 0.999 ± 0.001 0.606 ± 0.167 0.721 ± 0.067
Adaboost 0.998 ± 0.001 1.000 ± 0.001 0.646 ± 0.115 0.877 ± 0.113
RF 0.997 ± 0.002 1.000 ± 0.000 0.657 ± 0.003 0.947 ± 0.031
SVM 0.973 ± 0.006 0.987 ± 0.008 0.418 ± 0.113 0.772 ± 0.056
ANN 0.986 ± 0.005 0.994 ± 0.003 0.418 ± 0.113 0.772 ± 0.056
EFC 0.968 ± 0.008 0.998 ± 0.001 0.890 ± 0.012 0.975 ± 0.002
Table VIII shows the classification results obtained when
training with only attacks of the type DDoS NTP. With training
and testing in the same context, once more DT, Adaboost and
RF outperform the other classifiers, achieving over 99% both
on F1 score and AUC. EFC achieved a F1 score of 0.968 ±
0.008 and AUC of 0.998 ± 0.001, which are very reasonable
results. When training and testing were performed in different
days, we see again that EFC outperforms the other classifiers,
with F1 score equal to 0.890 ± 0.012 and AUC equal to 0.975
± 0.002.
Table IX
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS TRAINED WITH
CICDDOS19 - SYN
Train/Test same day Train/Test different days
Classifier F1 score AUC F1 score AUC
NB 0.684 ± 0.010 0.662 ± 0.024 0.694 ± 0.008 0.716 ± 0.075
KNN 0.949 ± 0.012 0.981 ± 0.010 0.835 ± 0.018 0.913 ± 0.014
DT 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.893 ± 0.143 0.915 ± 0.107
Adaboost 0.999 ± 0.002 0.999 ± 0.002 0.987 ± 0.016 0.992 ± 0.012
RF 0.998 ± 0.003 1.000 ± 0.000 0.970 ± 0.041 0.999 ± 0.001
SVM 0.918 ± 0.008 0.963 ± 0.008 0.874 ± 0.013 0.944 ± 0.010
ANN 0.949 ± 0.007 0.990 ± 0.002 0.874 ± 0.013 0.944 ± 0.010
EFC 0.851 ± 0.014 0.955 ± 0.009 0.912 ± 0.011 0.971 ± 0.005
Differently, when trained with only Syn (Table IX) or
TFTP (Table X) attack types, EFC does not outperform the
other classifiers. This is something expected to happen in this
dataset, since different types of volumetric DoS attacks have
similar characteristics between them, making domain adapta-
tion easier for classical ML algorithms. In the experiments
presented here, Adaboost and RF were the classifiers which
obtained the best results both when training and testing in the
same context and when training in one context and testing in
another. It is important to highlight that, despite not being the
best algorithm, EFC achieved very good results in all tests
performed, using only half of the information in the training
phase.
Taken as whole, the results presented in this subsection
show that EFC is usually better at adapting to other domains
than classical ML classifiers. In addition to that, it is possible
to see that EFC achieves AUC values similar to the best ML
Table X
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS TRAINED WITH
CICDDOS19 - TFTP
Train/Test same day Train/Test different days
Classifier F1 score AUC F1 score AUC
NB 0.720 ± 0.008 0.766 ± 0.099 0.694 ± 0.001 0.681 ± 0.030
KNN 0.971 ± 0.007 0.989 ± 0.004 0.657 ± 0.009 0.753 ± 0.018
DT 0.999 ± 0.001 0.999 ± 0.001 0.900 ± 0.110 0.915 ± 0.086
Adaboost 0.997 ± 0.002 1.000 ± 0.001 0.942 ± 0.082 0.990 ± 0.005
RF 0.996 ± 0.002 1.000 ± 0.000 0.745 ± 0.064 0.990 ± 0.007
SVM 0.962 ± 0.009 0.987 ± 0.004 0.737 ± 0.086 0.894 ± 0.032
ANN 0.970 ± 0.006 0.993 ± 0.002 0.737 ± 0.086 0.894 ± 0.032
EFC 0.967 ± 0.008 0.998 ± 0.001 0.902 ± 0.011 0.977 ± 0.004
algorithms, showing that it is capable of performing well even
if trained with only half of the information that other classifiers
use. In fact, not using malicious samples in the training phase
is likely to be the reason why EFC is so good at adapting
to other domains. On the other hand, this feature might also
contribute to a possible low performance in certain scenarios,
e.g., when malicious traffic share many characteristics with
normal traffic. Even so, EFC’s increased capability for domain
adaptation when there is a significant in data distribution is a
highly desirable trait in network flow-based classifiers, since
changes in traffic composition are expected to be very frequent
and new kinds of attacks are being constantly generated. In
the next section, we present our conclusions and future work
directions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present a new flow-based classifier for
network intrusion detection called Energy-based Flow Clas-
sifier, EFC. In EFC’s training phase, a statistical model is
inferred based solely on benign traffic samples. Afterwards
this statistical model is used to classify network flows in
benign or malicious based on "energy" values. Our results
show that EFC is capable of correctly performing network flow
binary classification considering three different datasets. F1
score ( 96% at best) and AUC ( 99% at best) values obtained
using EFC are comparable to the values obtained with other
classical ML-based classifiers, such as Random Forest and
Artificial Neural Networks, even though EFC uses only half
of the information in the training phase compared to the other
algorithms.
In addition to that, we analyzed different classifier capabil-
ities for domain adaptation and observed that EFC is more
suitable to that than classical ML-based algorithms. In three
out of the six experiments performed to evaluate that over
different datasets, EFC outperformed the other classifiers. In
the cases in which EFC was outperformed, the adaptation
was not difficult for most of the algorithms, meaning that
the two data distributions were not actually that different
across domains. We understand that EFC’s capability for
domain adaptation is probably linked to the fact that the model
inference performed in the training phase is based only on
benign samples, which prevents overfitting.
Considering the advantages presented, we believe EFC to
be a promising algorithm to perform flow-based traffic classi-
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fication. Nevertheless, despite the promising results achieved,
there is still room for further testing and improvement. For
instance, in order to obtain a more homogeneous distribution
of different attack types, we performed a dataset undersam-
pling, which might have had some effect on the results. Hence,
in future work we aim at performing a more comprehensive
investigation of EFC applicability to real world data and
different contexts, such as data bank fraud analysis.
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